THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PEOPLE LIVING IN KIBERA SLUM IN NAIROBI COUNTY FOLLOWING THE KENYA SLUM UPGRADING PROGRAMME.

BY

BRENDAH CECE ACHUNGO

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other

university.

Signature..... 4

Date. 11.07.2014

Cece Brendah Achungo

This thesis has been submitted with my approval as the University supervisor.

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Dr. Wilfred K. Subbo

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my parents Mr. Fredrick Achungo and Mrs. Mary Akinyi. Your unwavering support and your hard work has seen me through tough times to this place of calm and tranquillity.

To my son Johari Qwe Owino, you my dear inspire me.

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ABSTRACT

Housing the growing population in Kenya remains one of the greatest challenges of achieving the Millennium Development Goal 1. The recent proliferation of slums represents the insufficiency of resources and physical planning policies and regulations. Slum redevelopment strategies are often conceived as the solution to stop further growth of slums. Locally one such strategy is Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) which was launched in 2004 piloted in the Kibera Soweto east Village.

Guided by the need to ensure that development interventions place the people first in such strategies the study was therefore designed to answer the following questions: What are the social and economic effects of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme on the Kibera residents? How are the Kibera slum residents coping with the transformation as a result of the slum upgrading? Accordingly the overall objective of the study was to explore how the lives of the Kibera slum residents have been transformed following the slum upgrading programme. The specific objectives of the study were to investigate the socio-economic effects of the slum upgrading programme and to find out the coping strategies the Kibera slum residents have developed as a response to the slum upgrading programme.

The study was guided by the Modernisation Theory as propagated by Walter Rostow (1960). This is a grand theory of development that states that development can be achieved by following the processes followed by what is now the 'developed world'. This theory is premised on the idea of replication of change.

Data were collected using the survey method, focus group discussions and key informant interviews. In total, ninety-two residents were drawn from the Soweto east area and environs and subjected to a structured questionnaire. Four focus group discussions were held comprising of eight to ten participants obtained from the study site. Seven key informants were subjected to in-depth interviews on the topic of the Kenya slum upgrading programme and Kibera residents.

The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used in the analysis of the quantitative data collected through the survey method. The data were categorized, arranged and summarized and presented using tabulations, pie charts and bar graphs. On the other hand, qualitative data collected through focus group discussions and key informant interviews

were analyzed thematically. Content analysis, direct quotations and selected comments from the informants were used to present the findings.

The findings suggest that a majority of the slum residents are indeed aware of KENSUP but the information they have is scanty. As such the residents' participation in the programme has been minimal remaining as passive beneficiaries of the intervention. Further, the study has revealed that there have been numerous and varied effects of the programme on the lives of the residents of Kibera slum. The effects are numerous ranging from their social status and interaction to loss of livelihoods and displacement from their homes.

Some of the residents have developed coping mechanisms to deal with their current social and economic dispositions. They are joining co-operatives, taking part in town hall meeting and seminars in a bid to catch up with the rest of the 'developed folk'. On the other hand others have become apathetic to any other programmes that set out to uplift their lives.

The study recommends that the KENSUP strategy should evolve into a people centred, demand driven process bearing in mind principles of equity, justice and fairness. There is further need to host a local KENSUP office to be a communication and information centre key in this process of change. In addition there need to be studies focusing more on sustainability of financing strategies that would bear in mind the vulnerable and disenfranchised target populations within this area.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS- Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome.

- CWS Cities without Slums
- HIV Human Immune Virus
- KENSUP Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme
- KES- Kenyan Shillings
- NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
- UN United Nations
- UN-HABITAT -Settlements United Nations Human Programme
- USD- United States Dollar

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background

The 2003 United Nations Global Report on Human Settlements estimates that approximately 924 million people that is 31.6% of the world's urban population, lived in slums in 2001 (Field and Kremer, 2006). Locally about 60-80% of the population in Kenya is reported to be living in informal settlements. It is documented by the United Nations Habitat (2006), that half of the Nairobi population lives in at least 100 slums and squatter settlements within the county. Although forecasts are difficult, it is generally agreed that this number could greatly increase in coming years in the absence of strong policy interventions. These trends underscore the importance of slum upgrading strategies for addressing the growing problems of urban poverty.

Within the capital city Nairobi, the main slum settlements include Kibera, Mathare, Korogocho, Kangemi, Kawangware, Mukuru and Kiambio. These informal settlements are characterised by lack of access to water and sanitation, insecure tenure, lack of adequate housing, poor environmental conditions, and high crime rates (UN Habitat, 2006).

Kibera is a division of Nairobi County and is located approximately 5-7 kms from the city centre. Kibera is the largest informal settlement in Nairobi, and the second largest urban informal settlement in Africa. According to the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census survey report, the population in Kibera slum is 170,070 residents (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). Before the publishing of the census report, there was some uncertainty in reports as to the population of inhabitants. The slum is divided into a number of villages, including Kianda, Soweto East, Gatwekera, Kisumu Ndogo, Lindi, Laini Saba, Silanga, Makina and Mashimoni.

The growing challenge of poverty in Kenya's urban areas has been a major focus in the development agenda by the government, private sector, civil society and other organizations for the last decade (Kamau H.W and Ngari J., 2002). In 2001, the government recognised the need to focus on poverty alleviation by re-aligning its strategy towards achieving this by addressing the grim housing conditions through slum redevelopment. Therefore, the government developed the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme Implementation and

Financing Strategies in order to address the poor conditions in slums (UN Habitat, 2008). As such a partnership between UN-Habitat and government was espoused to develop and implement sustainable solutions to the challenges facing its urban areas. This undertaking birthed to the Kibera Slum Upgrading Initiative, the slum's Soweto-East village set the pilot in terms of settlement upgrading in the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP).

According to the UN HABITAT (2008), the Kibera Slum Upgrading initiative is holistic and integrated in the sustainable development approach. The overall aim of the project is to improve the livelihoods of people living and working in Kibera through targeted interventions to address shelter, infrastructure, services, land tenure and employment opportunities, as well as the impact of HIV/AIDS in the settlements. The programme set out to deal with land tenure issues, livelihood development and alternatives while using local capacities to redevelop structures and build the capacities of the slum dwellers. In addition, the initiative aimed at linking the slum dwellers to credit institutions, for instance, cooperative savings schemes which would also play an important role in empowering slum dwellers to access housing finance that generally is beyond their reach (UN Habitat, 2008).

UN-Habitat offered its technical advice by undertaking a comprehensive baseline survey with the aim of conducting situational analyses, socio-economic and physical mapping of the target communities and their living environments. An important aspect of the programme was to build the capacity of slum dwellers so as to ensure that they improve their livelihoods. Finally, the planned improvement of the capacities of local authorities in developing their planning capacities to cater for the sprawling development of their cities was to take place in the final phase. These efforts were aimed at improving local governance and strengthening the capacity and the role of the informal and the community sector in developing sustainable neighbourhoods (UN Habitat, 2008).

KENSUP aimed at ensuring proper organisation of the physical infrastructure that characterises all slums. A situational analysis of the slum listed the following losses that tenants would have sustained during upgrading: loss of proximity to job opportunities; loss of sources of income; loss of homes; and loss of socio-economic networks (Syagga et al, 2001). In this process the slum residents would lose their informal ability to sustain livelihood and economic empowerment (Syaggah et al, 2001). Informal entrepreneurship is documented as vital to Kibera inhabitants compared to a mere 3% reported being involved in the formal

sector (Crosson, 2004). A majority of inhabitants do not own the premises on which their businesses are situated. This means that formal licensing and payment of monthly or quarterly rent is unheard of within the slum. While emphasizing this crisis in living conditions, Syaggah et al (2001), also refer to the intensity and diversity of commercial activities and initiatives within the slums, which provide an essential livelihood to many of the residents and contribute to Nairobi's economy. This loss is a subject of concern especially within the view that almost three quarters of Kibera's households earn less than KES 10,000 per month; with an average of five people per household, this translates to approximately one USD per person per day (Mulcahy and Chu, 2009). The projected provision of free access to water will remove the livelihoods of established water sellers, who have laid out considerable amounts of capital (connection fees, deposit, materials and labour) to install their commercial water taps. Improving infrastructure may have the effect of increasing rent speculation. The slum residents, whose economic stakes are linked to the housing and service delivery situation in the slums, are able to predict the impact that a public intervention may have on their economic standing (Huchzemeyer, 2006).

Development interventions are proactively geared towards inducing change in organisations by building capacities of the organisations through which people participate in both their political and social affairs. Social change does affect the social networks and interrupt social organisation by bringing forth different social structures. Social capital has been defined as the institutions, relationships, attitudes, and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social development (Mikkelsen, 2005). Social capital can be as harmful as it can be helpful (Mikkelsen, 2005).

Social capital is enshrined in social interaction, of trust and reciprocity in producing collective outcomes, both beneficial and harmful. Slum residents live in close quarters and as such have developed very close knit social ties and networks with their neighbours. They form communities of people that identify with each other in many respects. With the redevelopment of physical infrastructure that will interfere with the communally designed living units, comes the reshaping of their social structures. In this case the residents may experience loss of familiar social networks and relationships that were critical to both their identity and survival. Moving into different formally organised structures will as such interfere with the shared values, norms, behaviour, reciprocity and trust of the slum residents.

The study aimed at looking at the transformation in the lives of the Kibera residents which may have occurred in the social and economic spheres of the people's lives. Development work is all about change. This is a change in the day to day lives of the people as well as in their practises and attitudes. Given the number of people settled in Kibera, and the difficulties associated with relocating them, it may be necessary to weigh the relative effects of social and economic disruption on different communities (Claude and Opiata, 2007). The study is concerned with the investigation of the effects of the slum upgrading programme on the residents' lives and coping strategies that the residents have developed as a result of the development intervention.

1.2 Statement of Problem

Slum redevelopment or upgrading is a concept that has been around for several years. Given the trends in urbanization and the growing slum populations, slum upgrading interventions may be an important component of the development process. Notably the redevelopment interventions have been geared towards modernising the people and localities where they are planned.

In Kenya there have been a myriad of slum upgrading programmes that purposed to provide housing for the poor and as such eradicating slums for example the Nyayo Highrise and Pumwani- Majengo projects (Huchzemeyer, 2006). These attempts however bore no fruits and projects failed to address the housing challenge that Kenya like many other developing countries are facing. Slums continue to grow as the living conditions of slum dwellers have become worse, especially due to the ever growing population and the need for housing (Nabutola, 2004). Instead of improving the lives of slum dwellers by enabling access to adequate housing, poorly targeted slum upgrading improves the lives of the better-off and displaces the original residents into expanding or newly forming slums (Huchzemeyer, 2006).

Development is a multidimensional process involving the reorganization and reorientation of entire economic and social systems. In addition to improvements in incomes and output, it typically involves radical changes in institutional, social, and administrative structures as well as in popular attitudes and, in many cases, even customs and beliefs (Mikkelsen, 2005). The Kenya slum upgrading programme was implemented in 2001 running through to 2009. The programme and the expected outcomes were highly publicised. The slum upgrading

programme, like many other development initiatives aimed at improving the quality of lives of the targeted individuals. However, since the implementation of the slum upgrading programme begun, no evaluation reports of the programme have emerged or been made public. There are no documented sources that indicate how the lives of the slum residents have been affected by this process of development. Further there are no public records capturing the voices of the slum residents on how their lives have been transformed both individually and communally.

As such, it was important to study the socio-economic effects of the programme. Thus create an understanding and awareness of the changes the community has undergone. In addition also capture the aspirations of the people the development initiative is meant for.

Therefore in view of the completion of the slum upgrading programme in Kibera Soweto East village, the study was designed to answer the following key questions:-

- 1. What are the socio-economic effects of the slum upgrading programme on the Kibera slum residents?
- 2. How are the Kibera slum residents coping with the transformation as a result of the slum upgrading?

1.3 Objectives

1.3.1General objective

The general objective was to explore how the lives of the Kibera slum residents have been transformed as a result of the slum upgrading programme.

1.3.2 Specific objectives

1. To investigate the socio-economic effects of the slum upgrading programme on the Kibera slum dwellers.

2. To find out the coping strategies the Kibera slum residents have developed as a response to the slum upgrading programme.

1.4 Justification of Study

Kenya's population is rapidly growing and the housing problem remains a great challenge for the government and development agencies to tackle. According to the 2003 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey, only 65 per cent of Nairobi's households have access to a consistent source of water, 66.5 per cent have access to waterborne sewerage, while only 2.9 per cent are reached by municipal refuse collection (Huchzemeyer, 2006). Slum redevelopment has been cited as one of the various ways of ensuring proper and adequate housing as envisioned in the Kenyan Constitution 2010 and the UN Economic Social Cultural Rights Convention (GoK, 2010; Nabutola 2004). The slum upgrading programme is an example of various other development initiatives that have been tried and tested elsewhere in the world by the UN HABITAT and other development agencies.

In a noble effort to reduce proliferation of informal settlements and slums the Kibera Soweto East was earmarked as a pilot for the redevelopment initiative. With the projected increases in slum population, the demand for urban upgrading interventions is expected to grow. The main aim of this study was to investigate the social transformation of the Kibera residents as a result of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme.

The study findings will contribute to academic discourse on the importance of evaluation of the effects of development interventions in this case the upgrading programme on the lives of the Kibera slum dwellers. These study findings could be use in finding sustainable avenues of eradicating the sprouting slums. Further the findings may particularly be useful in reference by informing design and implementation of any future upgrading initiatives that are both sustainable and responsive to local needs.

In addition the findings could add on to the information available on effects of such slum upgrading programmes or even housing projects. The findings of this study may be used a basis for further research in this area on the question of both a culture and gender sensitive slum upgrading process. These were issues that clearly came out as very important for slum residents.

1.5 Scope of the study

The study aimed at understanding how the slum upgrading programme has transformed the lives of slum dwellers in Kibera division of Nairobi County. The site of the study was Kibera Soweto East which is the location of the pilot phase of the slum upgrading programme. The study involved slum residents affected by the upgrading programme.

1.6 Limitations of the study

The process of slum upgrading in Kibera is a sensitive issue and has been subject to a lot of political controversies. As such access to true and reliable information from respondents was hampered and the researcher had to rely on probing questions to ensure reliability and accuracy of information that was obtained.

The study also suffered inadequacy of funds for fieldwork. However the researcher ensured that the sample size, though small sample guaranteed ease of work and was representative of the entire population.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This section reviews the literature relevant to the research problem. It also discusses the theoretical framework that guided the study.

2.2 Literature Review

2.2.1 History of Kibera slum

Kibera has the dubious distinction of being one of the largest informal settlements in Africa. It is reportedly the second largest slum regionally. The depravations people living in this slum like many others are fundamental.

Kenya's history of colonialism played a major role of ensuring both spatial and income segregation thus the development of slums such as Kibera. Kibera originated as a settlement in the forests outside Nairobi, when Nubian soldiers returning from service in the First World War were awarded plots there in return for their efforts. The British colonial government of the time allowed the settlement to grow informally, primarily because of the Nubians' status as former servants of the British crown, which put the colonial regime in their debt. Over time, other tribes moved into the area to rent land from the Nubian landlords (Mulcahy and Chu, 2009).

With the dawn of independence in 1963, a number of forms of housing were made illegal by the Kenyan government. The new ruling affected Kibera on the basis of land tenure, rendering it an unauthorized settlement. Despite this, people continued to live there, and by the early 1970s landlords were renting out their properties in Kibera to significantly greater numbers of tenants than were permitted by law. The tenants, who are highly impoverished, cannot afford to rent legal housing, finding the rates offered in Kibera to be comparatively affordable. The number of residents in Kibera has increased accordingly despite its unauthorized nature (Nabutola 2004).

The Nubian community has a Council of Elders who are also the Trustees of its Trust. This Trust now claims all of Kibera. It claims that the extent of their land is over 1,100 acres (4.5 km^2) . It claims that owing to State sanctioned allotments the land area is now reduced to

780 acres (3.2 km^2) . The Government does not accept their claims but its rehousing program envisions a land extent around 300 acres (1.2 km^2) for the claimed Nubian settlement. Neither side has left any room for negotiation from this position.

Presently, Kibera's residents represent all the major Kenyan ethnic backgrounds, with some areas being specifically dominated by peoples of one ethno-linguistic group. Many new residents come from rural areas with chronic underdevelopment and overpopulation issues. The multi-ethnic nature of the slum's populism combined with the tribalism that pervades Kenyan politics has led to Kibera hosting a number of small ethnic conflicts throughout its century-long history. The land upon which Kibera stands is public land owned by the government, though it continues to not officially acknowledge the settlement. There are no basic social services, schools, clinics, running water or lavatories are publicly provided, and what services do exist are privately owned.

2.2.2 Contextual background

Within Nairobi, 60% of the population lives in slums that occupy only 5 % of the total land area and the growth of the slums is unprecedented; the population living in slums is expected to double within the next 15 years. Further, only 22% of slum households in Nairobi have water connections and 75% access water through water vendors who overcharge, making slum dwellers pay more for their water than people living in middle- or high-income areas (UN-Habitat, 2006).

The most pressing issues in Kibera are the intense overcrowding where over 2000 persons occupy a hectare, lack of essential infrastructure and services, and poverty. These highly congested living conditions profoundly increase health risks and diminish quality of life for Kibera residents. With a large majority of households averaging five people living in single rooms of less than 10 square metres, infectious and skin diseases spread easily and food contamination is common. Families burn wood, charcoal and kerosene indoors for cooking and lighting, which contributes to high incidences of upper respiratory infections and irritation. Children play on roads and dump areas for lack of adequate open spaces (Mulcahy and Chu, 2009).

The approximately 2,880 structures in Soweto East are served by only 100 toilets, 50 baths, and no vehicular infrastructure of any kind. Together, these circumstances create an incredibly stressful living environment. The provision of sanitary services is also inadequate and the use of open spaces and flying toilets are common phenomena. Especially in Kibera, poor environmental sanitation leads to water and vector- borne diseases such as diarrhoea, malaria and epidemics such as cholera and typhoid are occurring with greater frequency (UN-Habitat, 2008).

A further concern is poverty. Upgrading is meant to make people live better, but nobody tells the slum dwellers how their poverty will be addressed. However, slum redevelopment alone cannot effectively be used as a poverty eradication strategy. Given the very real problem of disempowerment and patronage faced by residents of Kibera, an NGO in the area noted that the programme had been watered down to new housing development and was obsessed with creation of housing rather than addressing the governance problem (COHRE, 2004).

Almost three quarters of Kibera's households earn less than KES 10,000 per month; with an average of five people per household which translates to approximately one USD per person per day (Mulcahy and Chu, 2009). Maintaining housing affordability remains a major challenge to any upgrading or redevelopment project. Any fees for water, sanitation, electricity or rubbish collection may further burden households. Taxation on regularized or legally recognized land or shelter increases financial obligations even more (Mulcahy and Chu, 2009).

2.2.3 Economic and socio-cultural profile of Kibera

Findings from the Kibera Business Survey carried out by Research International (2004) give a picture of the economic structure of Kibera. Entrepreneurship was found to be vital to Kibera inhabitants as only 3% reported being involved in the formal sector. The report also noted that the overwhelming majority of inhabitants do not own the premise on which their businesses are situated and as such the upgrading should integrate residential security of tenure schemes with business security of tenure. In order for the upgrading to be successful, it was found critical that economic sustenance be an area of focus, not just living conditions. Developing tenure schemes that incorporate retail and work space with housing could assist in this aim. A majority of the businesses were barber/salon, retail, or hotel. As only 9% of respondents belonged to a business association, the upgrading could catalyze the formation of business associations around these key business types. A significant percentage of the businesses were open-air, usually vegetable sales. When designing and planning the upgrading, particular attention should be given to allocating open community space where these businesses could operate. By allocating this space, these informal businesses can be more formally monitored and organized into a more sustainable source of livelihood for these residents.

The slum dwellers have developed a general mistrust of government, in part because of disappointment over government-promised upgrading projects that never materialized. Past upgrading projects often displaced the original residents, leaving many doubtful and frightened about future government action. Scholars recommend that both current and future administrations must overcome this mistrust by promising only what they can implement. Facilitating a truly participatory process and carrying out residents' identified priorities will also assuage people's mistrust. This can prove particularly difficult in slums where people's schedules, obligations, and continuous involvement in community affairs may make participation impossible for many residents (Mulcahy and Chu, 2009)

Another feature in Kibera is the inaccessibility created by an organic urban pattern with narrow, uneven roads and footpaths that are prohibitive to vehicles. This makes policing rather difficult. Police do not go into the slum where no street lighting exists, thus crime remains significant especially after dark. Several sources indicate that it is extremely unsafe to be on the streets after dark for residents and non-residents alike (Mulcahy and Chu, 2009; COHRE, 2004; Syagga et al, 2001).

The social composition within Kibera is already changing with the knowledge of pending redevelopment. Some structure owners were said to have increased their rents, others were reportedly evicting tenants and bringing in family members to benefit from the development. These evictions will have displaced the most vulnerable, and the trend is likely to increase. Vulnerability to eviction is compounded by the insecurity of the informal rental agreements under which households occupy the individual rooms (COHRE, 2004).

2.2.4 Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)

Slum upgrading has been supported in various circles as one of the more effective means of improving the conditions of the poor. Upgrading projects focus on providing basic services to improve the well-being of low income communities, including a range of infrastructure interventions frequently undertaken in conjunction with social interventions, such as the regularization of areas with insecure tenure. Other infrastructure improvements include water, sanitation, waste collection, housing, access roads, footpaths, storm drainage, lighting, public telephones, schools, health posts and community centres. Social improvements can include better provision of health and education services, day care, training, and social protection programs (Field and Kremer, 2006). The process consists of physical, social economic, organisational and environmental improvements that are done in partnership with the citizens, community groups, local authorities and national bodies (Cities Alliance, 2002). In the case of KENSUP, the upgrading allows for improvement of the informal settlement in situ (Mitullah, 1993). Overall KENSUP aimed at creating an improved and sustainable urban living environment in Kenya.

Due to a combination of demographic, economic and political realities, many Kenyan towns are facing critical challenges. Perhaps the most important one is rapid urbanisation, which has outstripped the capacity of the government and local authorities to guide the physical growth of urban areas and to provide essential urban services to their citizens. This has resulted in the rapid growth of slums in the country's urban centres, which is due to a combination of rural-urban migration, increasing poverty and inequality, high cost of living, non-transparent land allocation systems, land grabbing, and insufficient investment in new low-income housing. Urbanisation continues in Kenya and it is estimated that by 2015 urban dwellers will constitute over 50 per cent of the total population. Existing figures are compelling evidence demonstrating the dire situation in many of Kenya's cities and towns (UN-Habitat, 2006).

Numerous non-governmental organizations have sponsored slum upgrading projects over the past several decades with varying degrees of impact and hardly any unqualified success. Finally acknowledging the problem's severity and persistence, the government of Kenya took a definitive step in 2002 by creating the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP). This programme was set up in the Ministry of Housing and focuses on implementing projects that

should provide communities with improved housing and access to basic services, secure tenure, and opportunities to generate income (COHRE, 2004).

The slum upgrading programme was piloted in Kibera, Soweto East, a village in the larger Kibera division in Nairobi County. The project started in September 2002 to be completed in June 2004. The overall aim of the project was to improve the livelihoods of people living and working in Kibera through targeted interventions to address shelter, infrastructure, services, land tenure and employment opportunities, as well as the impact of HIV/AIDS in the settlements. UN-Habitat's activities focused on the preparation of a situation analysis (UN Habitat, 2006). The KENSUP team catalogued existing residents in Soweto East after which residents received identification cards based on the enumerated list which will be used to determine eligibility for the improved housing. This was an effort to avoid displacement of current residents; meaning that people who move to Kibera after enumeration will not be given rights to the new housing units (Mulcahy and Chu, 2009). Overall, KENSUP aimed at creating an improved and sustainable urban living environment in Kenya.

2.2.5 Socio-Economic effects of a best practise Slum Upgrading Programme in Kenya

One of the most successful slum upgrading programmes locally in Kenya is the Jamii Bora Kaputei town project. This pilot project has attracted a lot of attention domestically and internationally. The project began in 2007, through the development of a new city the Kaputei Town for 10,000 inhabitants. The town and the houses are designed and produced in a way has enabled the very poor to acquire their own house through affordable housing loans. The project has provided 2000 homes that house at least 10.000 people (Belfrage 2009).

The town was built on a 293 acre parcel of land with all the infrastructure and services needed, for example proper roads, piped water and sewer, garbage collection, electricity, a town centre with 3100 business premises, a nursery, primary and secondary school, a hospital, playgrounds for children and sports ground for all, and a small industrial area. The residential areas are organised in neighbourhoods of 250 houses each. The homes are 50 square metres with two bedrooms, a sitting room and a bathroom built in permanent material that are produced in a factory on site (Samaranayake, Budinich & Kayser ,2011).

The factory provides employment to members and has enhanced the families □ capacity to repay their housing loans. Each house costs Ksh. 350 000 (35 000 SEK) which successful

members borrowed and will repay within 10 to 15 years. There are a few houses constructed with four bedrooms and costs Ksh. 495, 000 (Belfrage 2009).

The town was designed to be eco-friendly and green rich town with plenty of trees that not only look beautiful, but is good for wind protection and in time income earning from wood sales. Wetlands have been constructed for recycling wastewater which is particularly important in this semiarid area. In addition, the total cleaning of wastewater will protect the environment of all down-stream communities.

Electricity was the challenge for Jamii Bora to meet, as both being expensive for their members and the Kenya Power and Lighting Company had been delaying their promises of electricity in Kaputei. Instead, Jamii Bora decided to install electricity with the help of solar panels on each house, which is both inexpensive to use and environmental friendly. Once installed, which costs Ksh.12500, it is free to use and works in all rooms in the house.

Jamii Bora has pioneered a holistic, bottom-up strategy that has empowered hundreds of thousand women and men all over Kenya to meet their basic needs on a sustainable basis. Most often, the poorest people will be missed out, either because they are excluded by microfinance organisations, or as they will tend to exclude themselves, not seeing the programs being for them. Jamii Bora's success in reaching extremely poor people partly has to do with the time they spend getting to understand their members and gain their trust. Every branch Jamii Bora opens is in a slum or poor neighbourhood, ensuring that the poorest are being served. Jamii Bora has been very successful especially in two larger slum areas, Kibera and Mathare, where the impact of their programs is clearly visible (Samaranayake, Budinich & Kayser, 2011).

2.2.6 Community participation

According to Mulcahy and Chu (2009), a truly participatory process can be hard to achieve due to a lot of social dynamics including contrasting schedules, obligations, and continuous involvement in communal affairs. The government of Kenya places priority on community participation since observers have long noted that past upgrading projects have failed due to lack of citizen involvement. This includes the KENSUP programme which focuses on community education and participation. However, evidence shows the participatory measures have been inadequate, largely due to lack of information and feedback (Mulcahy and Chu, 2009; COHRE 2004). Language barriers have also been cited as an obstacle to participation, as much of the information is disseminated in English. Moreover, even when people are aware of public meetings, many often cannot take time off work to participate. Also, conflicts between stakeholders and organizations make consensus building extremely challenging. In addition, public officials often lack the knowledge and skills to implement participatory planning approaches. Many suspicions arose within the community due to the previously failed Kibera- Highrise estate, which involved slum clearance and forced evictions (Mulcahy and Chu, 2009).

2.3 Conclusion

This literature review revealed the gap of lack of evaluation of KENSUP. The available information highlights on the KENSUP strategy for poverty alleviation. It is clear that there are a lot of expectations on what the achievements of the programme should be. The existing literature reports on how dire the situation is at the slum. However, scanty information expressing local perspectives is available on how the programme has affected the lives of the local groups living within the slum. On the other hand the example of a best practise in Slum Upgrading within Kenya, Jamii Bora Kaputei town, provides an in depth look on the differences that have taken place in view of before and after change is initiated. One in this instance is able to assess the effects of the project on the lives of the target population. As such it is imperative to find out just how much the slum upgrading of Kibera Soweto east has socially transformed the lives of Kibera slum residents.

2.4 Theoretical framework

2.4.1 Modernisation Theory

The study was guided by the Modernization Theory. It is a grand theory of development which states that development can be achieved through following the processes of development that were used by the currently developed countries. Modernization theory encompasses many different disciplines as it seeks to explain how society progresses, what variables affect that progress, and how societies can react to that progress.

The main proponents of this theory include Walt Rostow (1960), W.A. Lewis (1954), Talcott Parsons (1951), and Daniel Lerner (1958). All of them felt that the West represented a perfect model for modernity which the rest of the world should emulate them in order to progress.

The major implicit or explicit tenets of Modernisation Theory are that societies develop through a series of evolutionary stages that are based on different degrees and patterns of social differentiation and reintegration of structural and cultural components that are functionally compatible for the maintenance of society. The contemporary developing societies are at a pre-modern stage of evolution and they eventually will achieve economic growth and will take on the social, political, and economic features of western European and North American societies which have progressed to the highest stage of social evolutionary development. The modernization will result as complex Western technology is imported and traditional structural and cultural features incompatible with such development are overcome.

The basic premise of this phase of modernization theory was that humans are able to change their society within a generation, and that this change was often facilitated by advancements in technology, production, and consumption. One key factor in Modernization Theory is the belief that development requires the developed countries to aid developing countries to learn from their own progress. In addition, it was believed that the lesser developed countries could then grow faster than developed countries and catch up; and that it is possible for equal development to be reached.

2.4.2 Relevance of theory to this study

Modernisation theory is premised on the idea of that Western technological advancements are catalysts of change as such they present solutions to the challenge of poverty. The development agencies initiating change in Kenya have for a very long time been groomed by their own western ideology of development and progress. The upgrading programme has been tried and tested in Latin America, Asia and here in Africa in an effort to ensure Cities without Slums.

The push to upgrade comes with a price for the target populations. The general proposition taken by Rostow (1960), and other modernisation theorists, was that in order to produce and

consume like the wealthy, one had to change "traditional" cultural attributes and proceed in orderly fashion to achieve a "take-off" into sustained development. They will have to leave their past cultural, social and even economic attributes that are not compatible with the new lifestyles that they are to lead whether it is for the better or worse.

It is true, that third world countries like Kenya do not have the modern conveniences and attitudes that accompany developed first world countries, but in order for them to become developed, they have to leave too much of who and what they are traditionally behind them in the process. They have indigenous knowledge and systems that have worked for them for centuries, and if developed first world countries try to modernize them, they will lose these to be part of and embraced by the global community.

In effect the society is itself transformed into a new community with remarkable shifts in the socio-economic lives of the individual members. The upgraded units produce new kinds of interactions and relations amongst the residents which are different from what they experienced while living in the slum. The new infrastructure offers new challenges and a renewal of perceptions of what life is at present.

The Kibera slum residents were presented with an opportunity of embracing modernity through infrastructural and livelihood interventions. As such the study investigated how the Kibera slum residents have dealt with reception, articulation and thereby social construction of new avenues as a result of KENSUP.

2.4.3 Assumptions

The study was guided by the following assumptions:-

a. The Kibera slum upgrading programme has transformed the socio-economic spheres of the Kibera slum residents' lives.

b. The slum residents have developed new livelihood strategies to cope in the different socioeconomic environment.

2.5 Definition of key variables

Slum- as defined by the United Nations agency UN-Habitat, is a run-down area of a city characterized by substandard housing and squalor and lacking in tenure security.

Upgrading Programme-a plan to improve, a set of activities leading to improvement or promotion, advance of something for instance housing.

Transformation- alteration, operation of changing something.

2.6Operationalization of Key Variables

Socio-economic effects of slum upgrading programme- The study focuses on the inevitable changes in the lives of the slum residents as a result of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme. These changes may be visible in the socio-economic spheres of the target group lives. Development intervention that seeks to improve lives of the slum residents may change how they interact socially amongst themselves, relate to external networks, their perceptions about the intervention at hand and how they earn their daily bread. Empowering of local communities ensures complete transformation of lives from a position of powerlessness to a situation of hope and awareness.

Coping strategies of slum residents- Due to change in the slum residents socio-economic spheres, new survival mechanisms may be developed to deal with the changing environment. The new environment may be hostile or better as compared to before the intervention.

Upgrading programmes focus on providing basic services to improve the well-being of low income communities, including a range of infrastructure interventions frequently undertaken in conjunction with social interventions, such as the regularization of areas with insecure tenure.

Other infrastructure improvements include water, sanitation, waste collection, housing, access roads, footpaths, storm drainage, lighting, public telephones, schools, health posts and community centres. Social improvements can include better provision of health and education services, day care, training, and social protection programs (Fields and Kremer, 2006).

Upgrading programmes purpose to make lives of slum residents better as such transforming how residents live day to day.

Such changes often produce new kinds of interactions and it is this new mechanisms of survival in a changed environment that the study sought to investigate.

Response to slum upgrading programme- Nairobi's approximately100 slums are among the most dense, insecure and unsanitary in all of Africa. Kibera slum located in Nairobi bears an unfortunate distinction of being the worst of all slums in Kenya. Living conditions are harsh and profoundly unforgiving. The deprivations people face on a daily basis is fundamental: severe overcrowding, terrible sanitation, chronic disease, malnutrition, and night time insecurity. These conditions have evolved over decades of indifference and neglect by both municipal and national governments.

KENSUP was a strategy to that end aiming to arrest the situation by addressing the deprivations faced by the slum residents. The study sought to find out how the slum residents did the slum residents react to the 'better' environment? How different is their lives now that their environment has changed?


CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This section describes the research site, study design, study population and unit of analysis. The section also describes the sampling techniques and the sample size, as well as methods and instruments of data collection and how data was processed and analysed, and findings presented. The section also highlights the ethical issues that will be taken into consideration.


3.2 Research site

Kibera Soweto East village is located in Kibera division (Map 3.2) of Nairobi County. The area is located in the Eastern part of Kibera and borders Nyayo Highrise, Silanga, Laini Saba and Lindi villages. Kibera is the second largest informal settlement in Africa . The total population of the slum is 170,070 residents (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). The slum has about twelve villages.



Map 3.1: Location of Kibera division in Nairobi County.

Source:<u>http://www.unep.org/roa/Nairobi_River_Basin/About_Nairobi_River_basin/cityProfi</u> le.asp. Viewed on 28th November 2011.



Map 3.2 Villages in Kibera division of Nairobi County

Source: http://www.kibera.org.uk/Maps.html. Viewed on 28th. November.2011

3.3 Study Design

The study was designed to investigate the socio-cultural and economic effects of slum upgrading programme in Kibera. This was a cross-sectional study, where both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection were used. The study run for about two months and was conducted in two phases.

The first phase involved quantitative data collection, using a structured questionnaire. A total of 92 adult resident household heads were subjected to the same questionnaire. The second phase involved conducting 4 focus group discussions with the adult resident household heads. In addition, 7 key informants were identified and subjected to in-depth interviews on their opinions and perceptions of the slum upgrading initiative, process and subsequent effects to both local residents and nationally.

Qualitative data was analysed thematically while quantitative data was analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) computer software. The findings are presented using content analyses, direct quotations and selected comments from the informants.

3.4 Study population

The study population consisted of the residents of Soweto East village in Kibera Division. The household heads of either gender made up the unit of analysis. Also interviewed were the key informants who included village elders, women group leaders, local administrators (chief and headmen), community development workers from local NGOs and KENSUP officials.

3.5 Sample population

There are about 2880 structures in the Kibera Soweto village (Mulcahy and Chu, 2009). A total of 92 individuals were included in the study. The 92 subjected to structured interviews were drawn from 100 households, 7 key informants and the final group were part of the 4 focus group discussions. I considered 92 respondents for the structured interviews to be a fair representation of the population.

3.6 Sampling technique

Systematic random sampling was used to select a sample of the households. Systematic random sampling was preferred since every resident would have an opportunity of being sampled (Frankfort- Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). The first sampling unit was selected randomly by the use of a table of random digits. A sample of 100 households is desired in this study as the population of interest is fairly homogenous. Therefore drawing from the estimate of about 3000 structures representing household heads in the Kibera Soweto East

village, (Mulcahy and Chu 2009), K=N/n where K represents the sampling interval, N is the population to be studied and n is the desired population. As such K= 3000/100 K=30

Therefore a systematic random sample of every 30th household in the location was used to obtain 100 households. In each household the house hold head was interviewed. The village was to be represented by 100 households on the study giving a total of 100 respondents. However this number reduced considerably as the 8 of sampled household heads did not know anything about the subject matter as such the researcher exercised her discretion to continue the study with the sampled household heads who responded on the subject matter.

Key informants for the in-depth interviews were sampled purposively by the researcher in the course of the field work.

Purposive sampling was also be used to select focus group discussions. In this study 4 focus group discussions were carried out; 2 for men and 2 for women. Each group had about 8-10 participants, different people of different ages

3.7 Methods of data collection

3.7.1 Secondary sources

Journal, theses, public records, government official publications and books have been used to gather background information to the study. These sources were continuously used throughout the study period as and when required.

3.7.2 Structured interviews

The broad area of the survey research encompasses any measurement procedures that involved asking questions to respondents. A survey can involve an intensive one-on-one indepth interview to a simple session of paper-pencil feedback form. These may include both interviews and questionnaires (Trochim, 2006). In this study, a structured questionnaire with both open and closed questions was used to collect the data. It was designed to elicit information pertinent to the assumed relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The questionnaire was administered by way of interview in all cases to minimise misunderstanding or misinterpretation of questions.

In the study area, 4 focus group discussions were conducted. Every focus group discussion comprised about 8-10 participants. This was done to facilitate the discussion due to their familiarity and better understanding, especially on sensitive issues such as the changes in lifestyles.

The focus group is imperative in any study since it enables the research scientist to compare the outcome of the discussions with the responses given in the questionnaires. This enables the researcher to come out with a consensus. In addition, it enables the researcher to observe the participants' first reactions to sensitive issues (Frankfort- Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). A focus group discussion (Appendix 11) guide was used to collect the data.

3.7.4 Key informant interviews

Key informant interviews were to provide additional information to that in the questionnaire. Key informants provided in-depth information on the people's social and economic organisation, folk practises, role of social networks, perceptions of and reactions to KENSUP. Key informant included the local authorities, professionals, religious leaders and nongovernmental organisation staff who were involved in the process. A key informant interview schedule (Appendix111), was used to guide the interview.

3.8 Methods of data processing and analysis.

Qualitative data collected through focus group discussions and key informant interviews, were analyzed thematically. Other methods, e.g., content analysis, direct quotations and selected comments from the informants were used to present the findings. Verbatim quotes were used, and where other languages have been used they will be translated into English.

Quantitative data was analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) computer software.

3.9 Ethical Issues

This study took into consideration the code of ethics in conducting anthropological research. The study ensured protection of the image of the agent (Institute of Anthropology, Gender and African Studies- University of Nairobi) by reporting accurately and correctly its findings without any bias. The informants were carefully handled and where they do not prefer the use of their real names so as not to reveal their private life and status, pseudo- names have been used. This ensures that they are accorded maximum protection. The study was conducted with full knowledge and consent of the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology. In addition, the ethical principles of respondents' privacy, beneficence and justice were upheld. An information sheet and ethical guide were read out to ensure that respondents were well informed of what the study is about. The research subjects were informed of their right to choose whether to participate or not, and were guaranteed the right to withdraw from the study at any time, if they so wished. Participation was on voluntary basis.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS.

4.0 Introduction


This chapter presents the analyses of the socio- demographic characteristics of the respondents, their understanding attitudes, opinions and perceptions of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), the effects and Coping strategies developed as a result of the same. The chapter further presents findings on the community level of awareness of and participation in KENSUP, social and economic effects of the slum upgrading programme and the coping strategies developed as a result and interprets these to show how they relate to other studies done elsewhere which have some relationship to effects of slum upgrading.

4.1 Socio- Demographic characteristics of the respondents'

4.1.1 Age

A total of 92 adult residents participated in the survey. The frequency distribution plot indicates a majority (32.61%) of the respondents were between the ages 26 and 33. This could be a reflection of the fact that at this age most people within this age bracket in Kenya are financially independent and run their own households. On the other hand 22.83 % of the respondents were between the ages 34 and 41 is the ideal age of most household heads, while 18.48% of the respondents between the ages 18 and 25 are just starting out having quite recently realised their financial independence. A further 15.22% of the respondents were between the ages of 42-49, while 10.87% were 50 years and over.


Figure 4.1.1: Age distribution of the respondents



4.1.2 Gender

The respondents were adult household heads where the males represented 62% of the sample and females 38% (Figure 4.1.2). The findings suggest that in as much as there are many male- headed households the number is also high for female headed household. As such there are many single mothers inhabiting the study site.






4.1.3 Highest education level

Exploring the highest level of education for the respondents revealed that 45.7% of them did complete primary school while 30.4% had no formal schooling or did not sit for their K.C.P.E exams as such did not complete Primary school. Only 15.2% had completed secondary school (Form Four) while a mere 8.7 % had a college/ university certificate (Figure 4.1.3). None of the respondents had any postgraduate qualifications.

Figure 4.1.3: Highest education level completed



This result suggests that a majority (45.7%) of the Soweto East Village slum residents had only attended primary schooling thus bearing only a K.C.P.E certificate. As such they can only provide unskilled labour in the job market. The results also suggest that the rate of passage to higher levels of learning is low thus the rate of school turn over decreases with increasing class levels.

In addition, the results suggest that it is quite possible that the level of education may have affected the decision making abilities of the study site inhabitants as such motivated or hampered their eventual interaction with the programme. In addition the level of education may provide an in depth look in to their level of exposure to development interventions as such also play a role in their attitudes towards and articulation of change.

4.1.4: Respondents Occupation status

The analysis revealed that 65.2% of the respondents are part of the informal sector while a further 18.5 % are unemployed. Conversely, 16.3% are employed within formal sector either on short contracts as casual labourers or on a permanent basis.

	Frequency	Percentage
Formal employment	15	16.3
Informal employment	60	65.2
Unemployed	17	18.5
Total	92	100.0

Table 4.1.1: Occupation status of respondents

From the Group discussions, the participants made it very clear that a great many were small scale entrepreneurs and petty traders mainly involved in selling groceries, mandazis, fish, pulling of hand carts while others run shops from within their own living quarters. They further also stated that their business premises were located either next to their houses or by the foot paths leading to their shelters.


In as much as these findings may suggest temporal employment and lack of employment, they also open our eyes to the glaring need of sustainable livelihood strategies key in ensuring that the residents can keep up with the ever evolving socio-economic environment.

4.1.5: Monthly Income levels of respondents

The results shown below suggest that 28.3 % of the of the respondents' income is between Ksh 0-5000 per month, while 26.1 % earn between Ksh. 5001- 10000 and Ksh 10001- 15000 per month. A further 14.1 % earn between Ksh 15001- 20000 and 5.4% earn about 20000 and above. Notably a majority of the residents per monthly income levels lie between 0-15000, suggesting that their capacity to attain higher/ better living standards is quite low. These numbers do indeed point to inability on the residents' part to participate effectively in the very competitive housing market. In fact the residents would need to rally massive financial

support if the eventual costs of the new homes would be higher than the costs that they are accustomed to. In this light the KENSUP strategy would have to ensure proper financial back-up or even access to credit facilities that would rope in the locals in terms of low interest mortgages and loans with longer repayment periods.






4.1.6: Place of Residence

On disaggregation by place of residence, 79.3% of the respondents were drawn from the Soweto east area, 10.9% from Silanga, 7.6% from Makina and 2.2% Undugu. This is summarised in figure 4.1.6 below.

Figure 4.1.6: Place of Residence



4.2: Respondents Awareness of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP).

Attempts were made in this study to investigate the level of awareness and knowledge of the Kenya Slum Upgrading programme (KENSUP), what the respondents understood by the term KENSUP and slum upgrading as a concept. This is because awareness levels and access and participation are intertwined. Awareness determines access and participation avenues to any development intervention.

Out of the 92 respondents 68.1% know of the term KENSUP while 31.9% do not know the term KENSUP but referred to the programme locally as the "Raila project'. This is summarised in the table 4.2.1 below.

	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	63	68.1
No	29	31.9
Total	92	100.0

Table 4.2.1: Awareness of KENSUP

During the focus group discussions, some participants kept on referring to the programme as the Raila project. In their view it is Hon. Raila Odinga who initiated the programme in this part of Kibera while he was serving as the Member of Parliament (M.P) of Lang'ata Constituency.

On the other hand asked how they got to know of KENSUP, a good number (25%) and (20%) reported that they had come to know of KENSUP through their neighbors and friends, and community education forums respectively. A further 13% had learnt of KENSUP through their interactions within their youth and women community groups. In addition about 11% reported that they heard of KENSUP through rumors, 10% of the respondents had known of KENSUP through the KENSUP officials (information point officers), while a similar percentage found out through Media advertisements. A final 3% testified that so far they had no information provided whatsoever (Table 4.2.2).

	Frequency	Percent
Information provided by KENSUP program	10	10.9
officials	10	10.9
Media Advertisements	10	10.9
Rumours	11	12.0
Community education forums	20	21.7
Community groups	13	14.1
Neighbors, friends	25	27.2
No information provided	3	3.3
Total	92	100.0

Table 4.2.2. Primary source of Knowledge of KENSUP


The question on primary source of information on KENSUP was to attest to the ease of access of information, credibility of source and reliability of information received. This would be imperative when designing improvement strategies that would encourage proper establishment of credible information flow and authoritative communication channels.

With respect to the just about average awareness levels of the programme amongst community members and other key local officers, a key informant observed that

"The low awareness levels were due to improper communication channels and had resulted into resistance by a good majority of the locals. In fact there is also poor monitoring and auditing of the whole programme results" (the Village Chairman of Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) on slum Upgrading)

Further probing revealed that a majority could not pin point the exact duration of the slum upgrading programme. That while even though 60.9% of the respondents indicated that the programme had run for more than a month and 39.1 % did not know the programme's duration, all of them could not respond to a question of when the programme started or when it is to finish the job.

Figure 4.2.1: Knowledge of Duration of KENSUP



4.3 Participation in Slum Upgrading Programme.


About 52.2% of the 92 respondents were positive that they were involved in the programme, while 47.8% said that they were not involved in any way in the programme.

Out of the 52.2 % that were positive that they were involved in the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme, a majority (65.3%) felt that they had been involved as beneficiaries, while 16% of the respondents said that they had been involved in evaluating the programme through stock-taking forums, score-carding and other forms of citizen's assessment avenues. A

further 10.7 % of the respondents reported that they had been involved in planning through a stakeholder analysis workshop and community mapping/ enumeration carried out by the UN HABITAT and KENSUP officials. Finally 8 % of the respondents reported that they had been part of implementation in one way or another through provision of semi- and unskilled workforce during the various stages of upgrading physical infrastructure especially at the decanting site.

The analysis suggests that the community has played a more passive role as beneficiaries/ target population as observed from a consensus amongst FGD participants that they were not consulted whether the programme was okay for them or even participation roles be defined for them.

Figure 4.3.1: Individual Involvement in the KENSUP




About 66.3 % of the respondents reported that the community had been involved in the slum upgrading programme, while 30% reported that the community had not been involved in the programme.

The question on what levels the community was involved in the programme elicited a lot of emotions as there was consensus from the focus group discussants that were not included in the conception of the KENSUP as such they had no place only as beneficiaries.

"Kibera residents are being used as guinea pigs and most development projects are trial and error. Can you tell us why most NGOs are located here? , WOFAK, KENSUP, KITUO, and international NGOs have their offices here. Kenya decided that Kibera is sort of a Mathari case that is why everyone comes here. But what are the fruits? There is nothing different you can offer. Instead you are perpetuating a lot of poverty instead of alleviating it." (Fortyfour year old female FGD participant)

Figure 4.3.2 Community involvement in KENSUP



The apparent levels of interactions as suggest by the findings may in fact be a very important precursor to the general attitudes and perceptions about the whole process of change.


4.4 Community Reactions and attitudes towards the Kenya Slum Upgrading programme.


About 27% of the respondents tended to indicate that the programme was in fact good for the slum and its people while 18% reported that the programme had poorly addressed the slum's problems. 14.1% of the respondents said that they did not know how the community reacted,

12.4% reported that the programme was very poor, 10.1% said that it was very good while 7.9% felt that the programme was average. A further 6.7 % and 3.4% reported that they felt that they were not fit to participate and that the programme was unfair to some of the slum residents respectively (as shown in figure 4.4.1).

A key informant observed that while the community did indeed think the programme was good they had become apathetic due to the long duration that the programme had taken with no tangible results for them.

"Everyone is waiting for a rag to riches story, that I lived in a one roomed shack here, but voila the shack is gone and here is my home now. Slum residents don't want to wait for their future forever; they want their problems sorted now" (a Pamoja Trust staff working in the area)





During a focus group discussion with the community members on their reactions and attitude, a consensus reached was that the slum upgrading programme which they likened the Chapter 4 (Bill of rights) of the Constitution of Kenya which they stated 'is great in spirit and letter'. The general feeling amongst discussants was that the only problem is the practicalities surrounding such aspirations. They reported that with such an elaborate programme description they were yet to see the fruits. Further they noted that the Ksh.100, 000 they needed to have saved to purchase the housing rights was well beyond their economic capacities.

"If I was to open an account with Co-operative bank and managed to save that one hundred thousand they wanted us to save, couldn't I have managed to construct a semi-permanent home in my rural area and leave all the suffering in the city? What these people do not understand is that we are poor...we can hardly afford to save at the end of the month. With my salary and the kind of bills I have to pay at each month end how many years will I need to come up with that kind of money? That is why when my wife informed me of this opportunity, I warned her off involving herself with such pyramid schemes" (a forty-eight year old male FGD participant)

A key informant noted that

"...if there had been attempts to include the community in the programme from the beginning of the process there would have been a major realisation of the goals of the programme. Look at Muungano and Pamoja...what they have been able to achieve in Mathare will take the government forever if they retain the bureaucracy and lack of transparency... Those living in those highrise flats are rich people who can easily afford to live elsewhere...have you seen their parking lot? How can our people compete with that?" (A fifty-two year old male resident and SEC member).

It is also clear from the findings of this study that a majority did not own the programme, and only a few individuals had really benefitted from the intervention. In this case the community members feel that there was very little space for them to contribute as reflected in the opinions of the FGD participants which is summed below;

"We woke up one day and found KENSUP already set up and running, we did not get any space to voice our opinions, any fora to express our views or any local office we could go to for redress as such our reactions are muted. We may or may not like the programme but who cares. No one is here to listen so we must move on with our lives" (a twenty-eight year old female FGD participant).

During an interview session with a key informant, she noted that

"...the Slum Upgrading Strategy is a gradual process that hoped and still aims to empower the community and residents, provide better housing solutions and reduce poverty in the larger Kibera area..."(a KENSUP official)

4.5 Level of Awareness of and Community Participation in the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)

Awareness of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme plays a critical role in the community participation in the KENSUP. In this study the levels of awareness of the KENSUP was considerably high at 70.7% while those who knew of an upgrading programme by any other term other than KENSUP were at 29.3%. These high awareness levels suggest that the slum residents are informed of the goings on of their community.

Findings from this study suggest that as much as at least 70.7% of the respondents know of KENSUP, only about 9.8% reported that they knew of KENSUP primarily through UN HABITAT and government, the main development partners. This can be contrasted to the 31% of the respondents who reported that they got hold of this information through neighbours, family and friends. The later as a source of information is unreliable and unverifiable. The study findings thus indicate that as much there is information there about KENSUP within this village, there isn't much that people may know of which is true. According to COHRE (2004) during the fact-finding mission carried by the organisation, literally all the groups and individuals talked to lacked accurate information of the Government's plans. This seems to validate the study findings that as much as a majority (70.7%) of the respondents are aware they lack accurate information. In this instance it is important to underscore the need for accurate information that would hence promote effective and active participation. The general view is that lack of accurate information has acted as a hindrance to the individual and communal participation and also injured the perception of the target population on the programmes goals and objectives.

Further awareness implies access to programmes thus encouraging involvement of the people in various activities. All urban upgrading projects finance access to water and sanitation systems, access streets, lighting, drainage improvements, works, parks, day care facilities, and community centres. Projects sometimes include components to expand access to housing and prevent urban crime and violence. According to the World Bank (2011), their experience has shown that the success and sustainability of upgrading projects is contingent upon community involvement in decision-making, implementation and operation and maintenance, and through financial and in-kind contributions. Providing secure tenure and facilitating home improvements by residents can encourage broader community participation in upgrading efforts. And most importantly, experience shows that upgrading can be affordable and that low-income residents are willing to pay for infrastructure services in certain conditions. The study established that there were no clearly defined roles that could rope in local population's participation. This seems to concur with the findings of an earlier fact finding mission led by COHRE in 2004. Non state actors suggest that in these programmes clear roles and responsibilities should be established for all participants, including governments, NGOs, the private sector and communities.

In Sen's (1999) "capabilities approach" to development, he argues that development policies should focus on enhancing people's capabilities, and rather than being focussed on the economy or institutions, development should be concerned with enhancing peoples' lives and freedoms. He authoritatively states that development is 'freedom' and argues that there needs to be paradigm shift in development practioners' perception of development from the macro-economic policies foundation of economic development to a participatory approach that encourages demand driven policies (Sen, 1999). Freedom should be both the objective of development initiatives and the principle means of development. Arguably achieving freedom is not an easy task. Freedom is gained by knowledge, as the saying goes knowledge is power

This discussion points to the principle of equity and inclusivity that should ensure ease of access to information for the community encouraging participation. The study findings reveal that only about 52.2% of the respondents reported individual involvement in the programme while 66.3% reported communal involvement. On the other hand 47.8% reported non-involvement at individual levels while 32.6% reported communal non-involvement. This study finding suggests either poor access to information that would enhance maximum

communal participation/ high levels of involvement or that the programme and its officials are inaccessible. The study findings also shed light to the nature of participation. In this case the majority, 62.8% of the respondents reporting their kind of participation is only as beneficiaries, while 5.1%, 7.7% and 1.3% reported being included in planning, implementation and conception of programme.

According to Cities Alliance (2011), one of the ten principles that would make slum upgrading successful is not plan for but to plan with the slum communities. The UN Habitat (2008) strategy document highlights that the slum upgrading programme is a demand driven process as such people centred. As such it is imperative to bring on board the residents buying into their knowledge ideas and various capacities. Residents are the main partners of slum upgrading programmes. Because their futures are directly affected by the decisions, and because they can help in the upgrading process, it is necessary that they be fully informed and actively involved.

Findings from this study point to a majority of the respondents (65.3%) reporting that they were only individual beneficiaries and nothing more. This suggests that to a large extent that the people do not own the KENSUP strategy and thus do not view themselves as drivers of this process of change.

According to Mulcahy and Chu (2007), community organization and participation is a critical component in upgrading and must be engaged from the time a project is conceived. Any project must be sensitive to the community in which it is implemented. On the contrary only 1.3% of the respondents reported that they were included in the programme conception, 5.1% in planning and 6.5% in implementation. A good number (5.1%) reported that they did not know their role in the slum upgrading programme.

The study findings bring to light that the practise of KENSUP that goes against international law and best practises. The right to participation is part of international human rights law. The General Comment No.4 on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that while the most appropriate means of achieving the full realization of the right to adequate housing will inevitably vary significantly from one State party to another... [This duty] will almost invariably require the adoption of a national housing strategy.... Both for reasons of relevance and effectiveness, as well as in order to ensure respect for other

human rights, such a strategy should reflect extensive genuine consultation with, and participation by, all of those affected, including the homeless, the inadequately housed and their representatives. (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1991)

Moreover, citizens and residents have a right to information, as clearly expressed in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Participation and sharing of information are not important simply because these are requirements in terms of international laws and standards. Participation is the cornerstone of international best practice strategies to deal with poverty and the provision of low-income housing, simply because of the enormous value it adds to projects. Participation can secure trust, which in turn promotes co-operation and unleashes energy and community knowledge, and with it reliable, appropriate information, all of which are indispensable ingredients in the design of appropriate and sustainable development processes. (African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1986)

The Kenya National Housing Policy does develop principles of involvement of all the target groups in housing development and provides the basis for participation of the vulnerable groups. One of the objectives of the policy is: 'To promote inclusive participation of the private sector, public sector, community based organisations, Non-Government Organisations, cooperatives, communities and other development partners in planning, development and management of housing programmes.' However there is still need to institute a practice of allowing room for direct and localised participation, representation and measures of direct control of and by the vulnerable groups. (Kenya National Housing Policy, 2004)

Furthermore according to Cities Alliance (2011), it is important to invest in a community infrastructure that helps build community cohesion. Investing in infrastructure demonstrates a government's commitment to an area and brings dignity back to a neighbourhood. If a government invests poorly in its people, people will not respect the infrastructure (Cities Alliance, 2011). Further the national housing policy includes slum upgrading as an objective, and national and local governments should collaborate with the residents on a number of slum-upgrading projects in particular the Kibera slum-upgrading project in Nairobi (COHRE, 2004).

Though many a development interventions stress the need to ensure full and active target population participation, some interventions fall short of this denying the communities an opportunity to initiate change that would perhaps better their lives. Informal settlements take up to 60 % of city residence and with such a high number of people to engage with it is important to ensure appropriate strategies that underscore the need for people to buy in. These findings on low individual and communal involvement probably offer an explanation to the communal apathy observed.

4.6 Effects of the Programme

About 60.9 % reported that there had been changes that people experienced as a result of the programme, while 27.2% reported that there had been no changes. Further about 11.1% reported that they did not know if there had been any changes.

When respondents were asked to list some of these changes, the respondents listed the changes as outlined in table 4.6.1.

	Frequency	Percent
Improvement of Social networking	5	5.4
Improvement of family relationships/family life	8	8.7
Change of lifestyle	3	3.3
Improved infrastructure	7	7.6
Ownership of home	3	3.3
Increased rent/expensive	9	9.8
Clean environment	7	7.6
Reduced insecurity	3	3.3
Don't know	4	4.4
Displacement	12	13.0
Loss of livelihoods	6	6.5
Loss of social networks	13	14.1
Costly resources e.g. water, electricity	12	13.0
	92	100

Table 4.6.1 List of changes as a result of KENSUP

4.6.1 Social Effects of Slum Upgrading

Survey data analyses revealed that there were numerous social effects directly linked to the infrastructural improvement touching directly on their quality of life, health and future, and which were linked to insecurity, according to the respondents. It was therefore of importance to investigate which were changes had affected the residents positively or negatively.

A majority (15.2%) reported that indeed their social status improved with better housing conditions, while a further 10.9% stated that they did not know the specific changes though there were changes. 9.8% indicated that they had better living conditions while 7.6% stated that they had experienced worsened living situations. A summary of the findings are tabulated in table 4.6.2.

	Frequency	Percent
New social networks	7	7.6
Better family life	5	5.4
Improved social status	15	16.3
Change of lifestyle	9	9.8
Don't know	11	12.0
Got rid of ethnicity and political divisions	7	7.6
No visible change	6	6.5
Better living conditions	10	10.9
Increased class divisions	6	8.7
Worsening living situations	9	9.8
Ensured knowledge of rights	5	5.4
Total	92	100.0

Table 4.6.2 List of Social Effects as a result of KENSUP
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During the focus group discussions, some participants observed that the fear of displacement was rife due to rumours that had been going round and reported that the programme had resulted in worse of living conditions. Others voiced that in as much as there was indeed a lot of fear; they had benefitted in the improvement of the sanitation amenities e.g. washrooms. The consensus was that the major highlight of the upgrading programme was the improvement of sanitation facilities even though they had to part with some Ksh.5 to access these facilities.

"Us women, we have very vulnerable living in these slum. Imagine how pregnant women have been surviving here. First the pit latrines that were dug here could not hold any human weight so we used to use paper bags in our homes. Now there are toilets with cemented floors at every biogas point, though not very clean they serve us at five bob per visit" (A thirty-five year female old female participant)

A Key informant observed that:

"...the slum had been worse off before with poorly constructed toilets built next to the river and other areas had no facilities...Residents had resorted to flying toilets and other less than perfect ways to take care of their needs. However the elaborate water and sanitation plan from UN HABITAT and Kenyan government has eased some of the discomfort especially women experienced" (a KENSUP staff working in the slum).

4.6.2 Economic effects of the Upgrading programme

Qualitative data analyses revealed that there were numerous economic effects directly linked to the infrastructural improvement touching directly on their continued ability to earn a living and security of their livelihoods. A majority (43.5%) reported that there had been an increase of cost as such higher cost of living, 22.8% reported that there had been loss of livelihoods while 8.7% reported that there was financial relief due to construction of cheaper housing facilities. A further 7.6% indicated that the programme encouraged hard work while 6.5% reported that their saving capacity has been improved. A final 6.5% and 4.3% of the respondents reported that they did not know and their livelihoods had improved respectively.


The economic effects	Frequency	Percent
Improved livelihoods	4	4.4
High cost of living	40	43.5
Don't know	6	6.5
Cheaper housing/financial relief	8	8.7
Improved saving capacity	6	6.5
Encourage/motivated hard work	7	7.6
loss of livelihoods	21	22.8
Total	92	100.0

Table 4.6.3 Economic effects of KENSUP

The focus group discussants stated that they were mostly small unlicensed scale traders using their residences as business premises. The general view was that after the enumeration was done and people were shipped off to the decanting sites, they lost their livelihoods and there were no efforts to compensate them.

"I used to sell match boxes, cigarettes, bulbs and other small items just outside my house, when now they displaced us to those flats I couldn't continue selling my wares. There was no space for me there and I was supposed to pay Ksh. 3,500 for the room I then occupied. Where could I get the cash to do so? ...I know of many of us who lost what little we had when we were moved there. So when we came back we found something to do here." (A thirty two-year old male FGD participant).

On the question of the gains versus what they had lost as a result of KENSUP, about 56.5% reported that there had been gains due to the slum upgrading programme, 35.9% said that there was none while 7.6% reported that they did not know of any as shown in figure 4.6.1



The summary (table 4.6.4) below is a list of what the respondents indicated as the gains of KENSUP:

Table 4.6.4 List of Gains as result of KENSUP

	Frequency	Percent
No response	4	4.4
Better housing/living condition	21	22.8
Improved health/sanitation/environmental standards	15	16.3
Increased cost of living	16	17.4
Reduced poverty/livelihoods	7	7.6
Introduced affordable housing	7	7.6
Ownership of house	12	13.1
Belief in themselves/Motivation	10	10.9
Total	92	100.0

About 80.4 % of the respondents reported that they had experienced losses on the onset of KENSUP, while 9.8% stated that there was none. Similarly 9.8% of the respondents did not know if there had been any losses as a result of the programme as shown in the figure below




Figure 4.6.2 Losses as a result of KENSUP

The summary tabulated below (table 4.6.6) provides a list of the respondents listed as losses:-

Table 4.6.6 List of losses as a result of KENSUP

	Frequency	Percent
No response	3	3.3
Loss of property by structure owners	7	7.6
Expensive life/loss of cheaper way of living	23	25
Homelessness/displacements for tenants	24	26.1
Loss of livelihood	13	14.1
Loss of hope due to the lengthy upgrading process	10	10.9
Loss of income	7	7.6
loss of space in the houses	5	5.4
Total	92	100.0

4.7 Effects of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)

This study's objective number one was to investigate the socio-economic effects of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP). The findings of this study suggest that there have been numerous and varied social and economic effects as a result of the Slum upgrading Programme with 60% of the respondents reporting positively to a question of whether the programme had changed while 27.2 % reported a negative view.

The survey findings also revealed that a mere 15.2% of the respondents feel that the KENSUP has resulted into improved social status. They reported that this was mainly due to the improvement of the physical infrastructure; housing units and accompanying sanitation facilities. According to Moser (1996), the international experience confirms that housing is a critical asset for the urban poor. A situation of insecure housing increases the poor's vulnerabilities, whereas secure housing is a productive asset which can serve to cushion the poor against the crushing impacts of poverty.

On the other hand 14.2% reported that the programme had increased class divisions. This is owing to the fact that a number of the residents who were initially targeted for the intervention winded back in the slum even after being moved. The findings suggested that they moved back as they could either not afford to pay the new rent rates or could not sustain the new lifestyles as they did not have any sustainable incomes. This seems to concur with COHRE (2004) findings that most resident beneficiaries moved back into the slum as a result of higher cost of housing in comparison to previous costs.

The study findings indicate that it is unsustainable to move slum dwellers into more expensive housing units without providing sustainable avenues of livelihoods. This is supported by an Urban Poverty and Vulnerability in Kenya report by Oxfam GB (2011), which found that the poorest urban-dwellers spend up to ³/₄ of their income on staple foods alone and women in the slums are almost 5 times as likely as men to be unemployed.

On the other hand, 7.6% reported to a worsened living situations as a result of displacement from their both their previous and new homes. This might have been due to the higher cost of living in the new areas. The residents may have lacked a fallback position and while a majority ended up back in the slum, a good number lost what they called home altogether.

The slum has been riddled with insecurity of tenure, so for most tenants their stay within the structures they call home is more often not guaranteed. The KENSUP strategy seemingly prioritised within its elaborate strategy securing tenure for the slum dwellers. With the general feeling that the villagers had been thrown back into the limbo of insecure tenure, quality of life has been reduced due the constant fear of evictions. Emergency evictions emanate to loss of assets, inaccessibility of income avenues and vulnerabilities especially for special groups such as women, children and the disabled.

While a small minority reported that they had formed new social networks (6.5%), experienced better family life (4.3%) and as such better living conditions (9.8%), a good number reported that there was no change (6.5%) and others did not know (10.9%).

The findings also suggest that the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme has also changed the economic sphere of the lives of the respondents, with a majority (37%) of the respondents reporting that it has resulted into higher costs of living for them, while 16.3% reporting that there has been loss of livelihoods as a result and a further 8.7% reporting that there has been some financial relief to them as the new structure pushed the rent rates within the slum down since the programme started. These findings suggest that there have been observable economic effects, whether positive or negative.

The findings suggest that the expense may be from the move into the high rise flats constructed as decanting site which was arguably an expensive affair for the residents. Further the rental rate of the units is higher than that of the previous ones the residents occupied. According to COHRE (2004), residents are unsure of what the government plans are. While some residents have been duly informed that the relocation site would have three-roomed units in high-rise buildings, with similar rents as currently paid in Kibera. Others had been given contradicting, and to them very disconcerting, information, including that the rent was to be 2,000 shillings for 3-bedroom houses, which most can hardly afford with due consideration of their monthly income levels.

Further the eventual living cost for example food, lighting, water and transport may be higher than the cost they had got used to while still in the slum. This came out clearly during the FGD, as the participants reported that while in the slum they could borrow from their neighbours for instance a cup of sugar or salt. On the contrary in the new houses it was hard to do the same and they could do without until one could afford. In the case of transport costs, the participants stated that the distance they had to walk from the decanting zones to work was exceeded that from the village to work.

The findings also suggest that on average, residents live close to where they work. This is especially true for the small-scale entrepreneurs and casual labourers. This suggests that households may place a high premium on short commutes. Thus if, in the short run, workers' job locations are fixed, slum upgrading programmes that require households to move may reduce welfare if they move workers farther from their jobs. The effect of such programme on welfare will, however, also depend on the value attached to housing and neighbourhood amenities.

In terms of livelihoods, 16.3% of the respondents observed that they had lost their informal businesses while 4.3% reported that the KENSUP had improved their livelihood. According to Moser (1996), households often use their housing units as a base for home enterprises, particularly where it provides women with opportunities for economic activity. This suggests that many who relied on their location to provide simplicity for their small enterprises lost these avenues of livelihoods. On the other hand others gained for instance one of the female participants of the FGDs observed that since construction started she began her food kiosk to serve the construction workers and this helped her a lot in managing fees for her children and other household expenses.

Though there has been a report of worsened economic dispositions as supported by the findings, KENSUP has also ensured that the structure owners reduce the rent rates of the structures. At least 8.7% of the respondents attest to this finding. The fear of losing tenants to rent their structures has pressurised the structure owners to reduce the rates. This seems to contradict earlier findings by COHRE (2004). The organisation observed an increase of rental rates with the onset of the slum upgrading programme. However this finding is supported by a key informant observation that the rates have indeed reduced owing to the rampant land-tenant conflict that emerged as a result of the 2007/08 Post election violence.

Moreover 7.6% and 6.5% reported positively that the KENSUP had fostered the spirit of hard work and greatly improved their saving capacity. One of the requirements of the elaborate programme is that the residents form Savings and Credit Co-operatives within their zones and


open Co-operative bank accounts which would help them save up to Ksh 100,000 for the allocation fees.

4.8 Coping Mechanisms as a Result of the Slum Upgrading Programme

One of the assumptions of the researcher was that as a result of the Kenya slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), the target population would hence develop means of dealing with the changes/ effects.

On the question of challenges faced while implementing the slum upgrading programme, about 89.1% were aware of the challenges that slum upgrading programme had faced while 10.9% were not aware (Figure 4.8.1).

Figure 4.8.1 Challenges during implementation of KENSUP



89.1% of the respondents who stated that they are aware of the challenges listed them as summarized in the tabulation below (Table 4.8.1).

	Frequency	Percent
Opposition from slum structure owners	6	6.5
Access to information/ rumors	7	7.6
Raising Ksh.100,000 was hard for many	11	12.0
Doubt and suspicion from residents	9	9.8
Negativity due to fear as programme is forced on residents	14	15.2
Disorganization during relocation	11	12.0
Question of social housing vs. upgrading	8	8.7
Beneficiaries too many to succeed	7	7.6
Corruption and favoritism/ unfair selection of beneficiaries	9	9.8
Insecurity due to fear of loss of livelihood	5	5.4
Displacement of residents	4	4.3
Total	92	100.0

Table 4.8.1 List of challenges faced by KENSUP

About 56.5% of the respondents felt that there are some changes in their quality of life while 7.6% could not tell if there had been any change. A further 35.9% stated that there had absolutely been no change in their quality of life (table 4.8.2).

 Table 4.8.2 Change of Quality of life

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	52	56.5
No	33	35.9
Don't Know	7	7.6
Total	92	100.0

When asked to explain how their quality of life had changed, the 56.5% of the respondents aware of the changes listed them as tabulated below (table 4.8.3):

List differences in Quality of life	Frequency	Percent
No response	4	4.3
More earning due to job opportunities	1	1.1
No pestering structure owners	6	6.5
Improved housing conditions	8	8.7
Better living conditions	18	19.6
Improved health conditions	4	4.3
Cleaner environment	7	7.6
It is expensive	9	9.8
People are plunged more in poverty	17	18.5
Displaced the residents	18	19.6
Total	92	100.0

Table 4.8.3 List of differences in quality of life

The respondents indicated that they had indeed been dealing with the effects of the programme through various means. A good number (32.7%) reported that they were not coping well as a result of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme while 25.3% reported that they were coping just fine. On the other hand, 20.6% reported that they were extremely badly off while 12.3% reported that they were averagely dealing with the results. The discussants indicated that they were living each day as it comes. Finally 9.1% reported that they were not affected by the programme. This largely included households that had moved in to the village quite recently.

On the question of how the residents were coping, a good number 30.4% reported that they were seeking better wage employment as they had to work. A further 21.7% reported that they had opened accounts and as such were fund raising to be part of the programme while 12% of the respondents indicated that they were anxious and not optimistic due to displacement and the constant fear of evictions. A further 14.4% of the respondents reported that they had joined local support groups and were attending regular meetings in an effort to forge forward. Finally 17.4% reported that they had moved out of the Soweto east village and 4.4% did not know what to do. A summary below tabulates (Figure 4.8.4) the various strategies developed by the respondents to cope with the effects of the programme.

Table 4.8.4	Coping	mechanisms	as a	result of KENSUP	,
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	Frequency	Percent
Seeking better wage employment	28	30.4
Don't know	4	4.4
Raising funds to join the programme-opening an account	20	21.7
Moved out of the village	16	17.4
Joined co-operatives and other groups and are attending regular meetings	13	14.4
Anxious and not optimistic	11	12
Total	92	100.0

During the FGDs, the discussants indicated in consensus that their new lifestyle was expensive and that were indeed pushed to work harder in the event they would want to be part of the programme

"... raising Kshs. 100,000 is not easy... throughout my life I have never been able to hold Kshs. 100,000 so I have to work extra hard to come up with that amount..." (A twenty-three year old female FGD participant).

"...we are in these co-operatives as we picture a better situation for ourselves and our children..." (A thirty-four year old female FGD participant).

"...for those of us who moved to the decanting zones we found life a bit expensive there and were totally unprepared...we moved out of those units back to the slum...we however hope that we will one day be able to afford life there..." (A forty-five year old male FGD participant).

Others indicated that they had to walk longer distances to their places. They explained that if they chose to take up transport means it would be expensive to them. They further indicated that better implementation strategies ought to be developed to allow them as the beneficiaries benefit.

A church leader who works closely with a community group within the area confirmed in a key informant interview that life was indeed hard for the residents. He stated that the residents were anxious due to the long duration of implementation and highly politicised process and controversial debate about the slum land ownership. He indicated that historically Kibera has elicited the emotions of many politicians and he rightly informed the researcher that there is a suit in court contesting land ownership in the slum.

The analyses of the survey data indicated that many of the residents who had been moved to the decanting zones, had moved back into the slum because as they reported life was too costly there. The respondents indicated that the expense arose ranging from the higher fees charged as monthly rent to the cost of meals per day. As such the newly found status had a greater price tag.

4.9 Coping Strategies developed as a result of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)

The objective number two was to find out the coping mechanisms developed by residents as a result of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP). The findings of this study suggests that a good number (32.7%) of the respondents are not coping well while 25.3% reported that they were doing well. 20.6% reported that they were worse off as a result of KENSUP. This can be largely attributed to uncertainty and anxiety that has come about as a result of lack of accurate and authoritative information. This has been further compounded by the pending legal suit instituted over legality of tenure and the ad hoc and seemingly irregular allocation of units to beneficiaries. Evictions and displacement threatens the already disposed folk living within this slum. Exploring further respondents indicated that they are not optimistic about the slum upgrading strategy providing the much needed solutions to their housing inadequacies.

According to COHRE (2004), slum-upgrading guidelines at the national or local level may also allow facilitate the replication of slum upgrading before completion of the Kibera project which has a possibility of being stalled for lengthy periods. However, there are real opportunities, at localised level, for the project to take a more demand-driven approach than has been the case to date, and thereby potentially to avoid conflict and evictions of tenants and loss of livelihoods for small structure owners. The study findings reveal that a number of the respondents (30.4%) have been motivated to work harder so that they can be able to save and raise the allocation costs. As such they are seeking better wage employment and starting up small business as means of improving their financial power to participate in the programme. A further 21.7% of the respondents indicated that they have opened a Co-operative account to enable them save so as to be part of the programme. An additional 14.1% of the respondents have joined co-operatives and other groups. The respondents reported that they are attending regular settlement committee meetings and other communal meetings held to discuss the KENSUP strategy. In this way they are expressing their discontent with government's intention to simply build new houses. They fear that the poor will be 'exploited,' especially if they're expected to temporarily relocate to a decanting site. Respondents suggested a number of other possible strategies KENSUP officials should consider including in situ upgrading so that they could live within the village while the upgrading proceeded. These groups are networks of social support and offer strength in numbers in terms of bargaining power. These numbers reflect a community that is demanding their seat at the negotiating table. Findings also suggest that the majority of tenants and structure owners are demanding their right to be heard.

On the other hand the study findings also revealed that 17.4% of the respondents themselves have been displaced or moved their business out of the village due to fear and uncertainty. The respondents who reported loss of livelihoods run micro-businesses with tiny profit margins, and businesses with no other income to support them (e.g. those of single parents). According to Oxfam GB (2009), for the micro-businesses, it is almost impossible to support increased demands for credit, as well as lower profits per transaction and lower transaction volumes. In order to stay in business, traders will change quantities but not prices where possible. Some businesses have even expanded, but profit margins are the same, due to reduced profits per transaction.

A further 4.4% indicated that they did not know what to do. This also had a lot to do with the rumours of evictions that caused a lot of anxiety and pessimism. As such many indicated that it is indeed hard for them to take up new ways of living due to uncertainty over sustainability.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

5.0 Introduction

This study has explored how the lives of the Kibera Slum residents have been transformed as a result of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme, specifically residents of Soweto East village. The study looked at particularly the awareness of and participation in KENSUP, social and economic effects of the slum upgrading programme and the coping strategies developed as a result.

5.1 Summary of the Findings

Slum upgrading is widely acknowledged as one of the more effective means of improving the housing conditions of the poor. Cities Alliance (2011) talks of slum upgrading as consisting of 'physical, social, economic, organizational and environmental improvements undertaken cooperatively and locally among citizens, community groups, businesses and local authorities'. Slum upgrading has been hailed as a 'linchpin' of any urban poverty strategy. From a housing rights perspective, slum upgrading can play an important role in improving existing housing stock and ensuring that complete reliance is not placed upon new investment in low-income housing, which could never cover the full extent of the need. Upgrading can also improve tenure security and provide alternatives to evictions.

However, slum-upgrading projects just like KENSUP are by no means easy to organise, resource, implement or replicate, particularly not in a context of poverty and underdevelopment. To be successful, slum upgrading projects require careful design and management. In particular, local conditions need to be considered; housing affordability and project finance must be sustainable in the long-term; consultation and direct, meaningful and sustained community involvement are vital; and residents must be effectively protected from evictions and violence. Slum upgrading also requires huge resources, plus long-term political will and stamina to see the process through in spite of the setbacks, dissatisfaction and conflicts that will, inevitably, occur along the way.

5.1.1 Socio-economic effects of KENSUP

The housing conditions of the urban poor within the study site are deplorable. The informal settlement houses at least 50,000 people, of which it is estimated that a majority are informal traders and subsist on petty trading and hawking of goods by the way side and next to their houses.

The study findings point to high levels of awareness. However the information within the public is not reliable and authoritative. Residents are informed mainly through rumours and hearsay. As such there is a general feeling of alienation on the part of residents. According to an Amnesty International report (2009), the government had not taken adequate measures to provide information to residents or guarantee the affordability and accessibility of the temporary and permanent housing units being created. A majority of participants interviewed in this study believe that the programme was implemented without effective and adequate consultations with them. They pointed to the need for hosting a local KENSUP office where they would be able to gain access to information pertinent and relevant to the programme. As the old adage goes knowledge is power. It is power to voice one's ideas, power to be opined, power to participate and the delegate for performance. According to Odindo and Bodewes (1999), the first lesson of the failure of Mathare 4A relates to the lack of participation in all layers of decision-making. There was poor representation with only two residents handpicked to serve on the Consultative Advisory Board to represent over 25,000 residents.

There have been numerous effects both negative and positive on the social and economic spheres of the lives of the slum residents. Respondents reported that the upgrading of the physical infrastructure had raised their social status as a result of in situ improvement of sanitation facilities. In addition they reported increased class distinction owing to corruption as the intended beneficiaries of the KENSUP had been locked out of the improved high rise flats and these now housed richer tenants. A majority of participants interviewed in Kibera expressed very strong fears about the slum upgrading project in particular, their right to return to their plot after the upgrade, and the affordability of the planned new houses. This anxiety was strengthened by reports of cases of tenants of pre-emptive evictions by structure owners who hope to benefit from slum upgrading initiative.

5.1.2 Coping Mechanisms as a Result of Slum Upgrading Programme

In addition, a number of respondents expressed concerns about the evident loss of livelihood avenues. Respondents cited the losses to small scale traders and vulnerability of structure owners who were often women or older persons who relied upon rent for their livelihood. Not only were they threatened by forced eviction at the settlement level but also it was difficult to arbitrate disputes and they were concerned that slum upgrading plans had excluded them. Further maintenance and service charges for individually serviced three roomed units in multi-story buildings were reported to be relatively high. If allocated to the original residents of Kibera, it is likely that such costs will not be recovered. Unless this is anticipated through planning and budgeting, the envisaged solution for Kibera will result in the displacement of the targeted population.

5.2 Conclusion

The study found that the residents were informed about the slum upgrading strategy. Many of the respondents had indeed acknowledged the presence of KENSUP within the village. However the study established that the residents had scanty and unreliable information about the programme. As such though the effects of the Kenya Slum Upgrading have been numerous, the residents had no way of assessing how the programme would change their lives therefore hampering the residents' ability to make informed decisions.

The study also established that the effects of KENSUP were many. Thus confirming the first assumption that the slum upgrading programme had transformed the social and economic spheres of the Kibera slum residents' lives. The effects include the more positive results for instance better and affordable housing condition, improved sanitation standards, motivation and ownership of property.

However the study also established that the residents feel that not all the effects were positive. Some of them reported non-inclusion, unfairness, displacement and evictions, uncertainty and anxiety while a good majority reported loss of livelihoods a concern. The study also revealed that the residents of Soweto east Kibera are yet to internalise the process as their own in contrast to how it has been propagated to be a people's process supported by the government and UN-Habitat.

The study also established that the residents have developed new mechanisms to cope with the new socio-economic environment ascertaining the second study assumption. Many of the residents have sought better wage employment and opened bank accounts as avenues of raising funds to cater for the allocation costs in the hope that they can be included in the KENSUP. On the other hand others have moved out of the village in an effort to save their failing businesses and guarantee non displacement of their houses due to uncertainty and anxiety as the residents are not well informed of the slum upgrading process. Lack of information has created suspicion over KENSUP's objectives and affected the residents' participation in a process that is changing their lives.

The study therefore came to the conclusion that the residents though fully aware of the KENSUP are yet to be fully included in the programme to pass the test of a demand driven process. The general feeling is that the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme had already been decided and the community was simply expected to rubberstamp the process.

5.3 Recommendations

It is against the foregoing findings that the study seeks to highlight the need for KENSUP strategy to evolve into a people centred demand driven process. This shift will indeed bring on board the slum residents as active drivers of the change process. This is so as development interventions need to develop a human face and bear in mind the principles of equity, justice and fairness. Furthermore it may be of great importance to determine the best approach of integrating people's participation. The bottom up approach has been cited as the best way to do this.

In addition to that the Kenya Slum upgrading Programme needs to host a local office that can acts as a point of information pertinent and relevant to the programme. This would enhance access for the locals interested in the process of change. This will aid in reducing the anxiety, tension and pessimism shrouding the slum upgrading programme.

Financing strategies ought to be developed in the form of loans or mortgages that attract low interest to encourage participation from the disenfranchised group. Further studies could be carried out to investigate options that can encourage participation ensuring sustainability of the programme hence enhancing of livelihoods and improving of quality of life.

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UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF ANTHROPOLOGY, GENDER AND AFRICAN STUDIES The Social Transformation of the People Living in Kibera Slum in Nairobi County following the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme.

Hallo, my name is Cece Brendah Achungo. I am a post-graduate student from the University of Nairobi. I am here today trying to solicit your views on the effects of the Slum Upgrading Programme on the social and economic spheres of the Soweto- East village residents in Kibera division. I will take 30 minutes of your time. I ask for your permission that we may discuss this topic. Your experiences and opinions are important to me. I assure you that information given here is confidential and not intended to harm you in any way. I would only ask that you feel free and answer my questions truthfully. I ask for your permission to participate in this study.

Thank you for agreeing to participate

Note: Answer all the questions accurately and as detailed as possible. Information collected will be highly confidential and is only for the purpose of this research.

Where applicable put a cross X or write your answer in the space provided.

Questionnaire number:_____

Date:

A. Personal details of the informant.

Name of the respondent (Optional)

Age	Sex/ Gender
Occupation	Income(p.m)
Place of Residence	

В.	Awareness of Kenya Slum	Upgrading Programme (KENSUP).
1	Are you aware of the	A. Yes
	Kenya Slum Upgrading	B. No
	Programme (KENSUP) ?	
	If no go to Qn. 2	
	If yes got to Qn. 3	
2	Have you heard of any	
	upgrading programme	
	within this area?	
	If no terminate.	

3	How did you know of the	
	Kenya Slum Upgrading	
	Programme (KENSUP)?	
4	Explain your answer in	
	Question3	
	C	
5	What was the duration of	
5	the programme?	
		Shum Ungrading Dragramma
(Slum Upgrading Programme A. Yes
6	Were you involved in the	
	Programme?	B. No
	If yes, how?	
	If no go to Qn. 7	
7	In your view, were the	A. Yes
	community members	B. No
	involved in the upgrading	
	process?	
	If yes how?	
8	What were the	
0		
	community members'	
	attitudes/ reactions	
	towards the programme?	
	(How and why?)	

	D. Effects of the Progra	imme
9	Are you aware of any changes people have experienced as a result of the programme? Can you mention some?	A. Yes B. No
10	 In your opinion, what have been the a. Social effects of the upgrading programme? b. Economic effects of the upgrading programme? 	
11	In your own opinion, are there any gains/ losses as a result of the programme?	A. Yes B. No
12	If yes, what? How are you dealing with the effects that have resulted from the programme?	
14	 a. In your own opinion, was the programme successful? b. Why? 	A. Yes B. No

	(Whether yes or no)	
15	Are you aware you aware of any challenge that the programme might have encountered during the implementation process? If yes which ones? If no proceed to the next question.	A. Yes B. No
16	What are the changes you have seen after the implementation of the upgrading programme?	
17	Explain your answer to question 16	
18	Can you give a general comment on the programme?	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Thank you for your cooperation.

Appendix 11: Focus Group Discussion Guide

The following themes will guide the focus group discussions.

The information to be gathered will be used only for study purposes.

The objective of this method of data collection is to verify information pertaining to:

- The level of awareness on and participation in the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme.
- Changes to life or effects of slum upgrading programme
- Coping mechanisms in response to KENSUP
 - 1. Awareness of Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme(Local names and knowledge)
 - 2. Involvement or communal participation in the programme
 - 3. Community perceptions on , opinions of and reactions to the programme
 - 4. In one own opinion changes that have resulted from the programme.
 - 5. Social and economic effects of the programme (personal, family and community).
 - 6. Coping strategies with transformation of life.
 - 7. General comments on the programme.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Appendix III: Key informant interview guide

Case study No.:	 	
Name:		
Occupation:		

Institution:		

- 1. How long have you served in your position/ been engaged in the slum?
- 2. Are you aware of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme?
- 3. Did you participate in the programme, how?
- 4. How did the community view the programme?
- 5. Why was the programme piloted in Kibera Soweto East and why slum Upgrading and not any other development intervention?
- 6. In your own opinion, what do you think have been the changes with KENSUP in the lives of residents? (positive or negative)
- 7. In your view, were there any challenges that the programme faced from the conception to implementation?
- 8. In your own opinion, do you think the programme achieved the objectives?
- 9. Do you think that there were any missed opportunities or anything that could have been done differently?
- 10. General comments on the programme.

Thank you for your cooperation.