Power, Inequality, and Local Land Conflict in Afghanistan: A Study of Kabul’s Peri-Urban Areas

Introduction

Land Conflict in Afghanistan represents a complex intersection of power dynamics, structural inequality, and institutional weakness, particularly within Kabul's rapidly expanding peri-urban settlements.
Land Conflict in Afghanistan represents a complex intersection of power dynamics, structural inequality, and institutional weakness, particularly within Kabul's rapidly expanding peri-urban settlements.This comprehensive summary analyzes the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies' 2019 research paper, which investigates how hidden power hierarchies entangle with disputes over land tenure, offering critical insights for researchers, housing professionals, and policymakers working on urban development in fragile states.

Understanding Land Conflict in Afghanistan: Research Methodology and Context

The study employs a qualitative research methodology, conducting 28 in-depth interviews between December 2018 and March 2019. Participants included 20 community members from Kabul's peri-urban areas—comprising lay individuals, Imams, Maliks, and Wakil Guzars—and 8 officials from the Afghanistan Independent Land Authority (ARAZI).
Researchers utilized snowball sampling with multiple unassociated middlemen to minimize selection bias, ensuring diverse perspectives from informal settlements across the capital.
Land Conflict in Afghanistan is fundamentally shaped by the country's incomplete land registration system. Fewer than 30% of immovable properties in urban areas and only 10% in rural areas have been formally registered by state institutions.
In peri-urban Kabul, residents typically hold ownership through unregistered customary titles (urfi qabala), which lack standardization and legal certainty. This documentation gap creates fertile ground for disputes over ownership, inheritance, easements, and changes in land use.

Historical Land Ownership and Recent Reform Efforts

Afghanistan's land administration history reflects decades of institutional disruption. The Department of Land Affairs (AMLAK) and Cadaster Directorates, established in 1963, conducted the country's first multi-purpose land inventory.
However, systematic nationwide surveying never materialized, and the Soviet invasion in 1979, followed by prolonged civil unrest, destroyed significant portions of existing land records. Even preserved documents often fail to reflect changes in tenure over time, as lands have been informally partitioned, sold, and resold repeatedly.
Recent reform efforts include the National Land Policy (2007, revised 2017), the Land Management Law (2017), and the Law on Land Acquisition (2017). ARAZI, formed through mergers of previous land authorities, leads current initiatives to establish a formal titling regime.
Central to these efforts is the Occupancy Certificate (OC), introduced under the 2017 Regulation on Registration of Urban Informal Properties. The OC aims to grant property rights to residents who have continuously occupied land for 15 years, offering 300 square meters at a nominal fee. Targeting eight cities—including Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar—the program seeks to cover 150,000 parcels by 2020.
Despite initial optimism, implementation challenges persist. Individuals occupying land for less than 15 years remain ineligible. Properties between 300-1,000 square meters must be purchased at a "fair price," while land exceeding 1,000 square meters faces state repossession—provisions that may disproportionately affect impoverished residents.
Critically, formal titling alone may not redirect dispute resolution away from informal community mechanisms toward formal courts, limiting the OC's potential to reduce Land Conflict in Afghanistan.

Five Power Hierarchies Driving Land Conflict in Afghanistan

The research identifies five distinct power hierarchies that perpetuate inequality and fuel disputes over land in Kabul's peri-urban areas. Understanding these dynamics is essential for designing interventions that address root causes rather than symptoms.

Powerful Land Grabbers and Accountability Gaps

Powerful land grabbers—often parliamentarians, warlords, government officials, or tribal leaders—operate largely outside accountability structures. They frequently claimed large tracts of government or private land during periods of state weakness, particularly after the Taliban's collapse.
By fencing off claimed areas and creating informal deeds, these actors monetize grabbed land by selling it to buyers seeking housing. Interviewees described how land grabbers exploit patronage networks within government to shield themselves from consequences, while lay individuals fear retaliation if they challenge these claims.
Paradoxically, purchasers of grabbed land may benefit from the grabber's monopoly of power, gaining a degree of stability in their informal tenure—though this perpetuates systemic injustice.

Corrupt Officials and Institutional Abuse

Corrupt government officials leverage their positions to extract benefits from land disputes at the expense of ordinary citizens. Interviewees recounted instances where officials deliberately instigated conflicts over private property to solicit bribes or manipulate outcomes.
One respondent noted, "The government officials encourage problems—this way they get money from the problems created." Such abuse erodes public trust in state institutions and discourages residents from seeking formal recourse, reinforcing reliance on informal dispute resolution. Addressing Land Conflict in Afghanistan, therefore, requires strengthening institutional accountability and judicial independence.

Community Powerbrokers: Imam, Malik, and Wakil Guzar

Community powerbrokers occupy a pivotal role in mediating land disputes. The Imam provides religious leadership and moral guidance; the Malik serves as a respected elder whose experience commands authority; and the Wakil Guzar acts as an elected liaison between communities and government.
While these figures generally acknowledge the theoretical value of formal titling, they actively encourage local resolution of disputes. One Wakil explained that resolved cases are documented with signatures and stamps, with copies sent to courts only if a formal claim was initially filed.
This preference for informal arbitration maintains powerbrokers' influence but may create parallel systems where outcomes diverge from formal property records. Consequently, even with Occupancy Certificates, Land Conflict in Afghanistan may continue to be managed through community hierarchies rather than state institutions.

Family Dynamics and Inheritance Inequalities

Inheritance represents a primary channel for property transfer, yet family power dynamics frequently undermine equitable distribution. While Islamic and Afghan law grant women inheritance rights—typically half the share of male heirs—social norms often prevent women from claiming these entitlements.
Interviewees described how brothers and family elders pressure female relatives to forgo their shares to preserve family honor. Economic hardship increasingly compels women to assert their rights, but they face stigma and limited recourse.
One respondent stated, "If I get help from local leaders, they do not listen to me. They will call me a bad woman because in Afghan tradition women do not claim their rights." Formal titling alone cannot overcome these deeply embedded gender inequalities; sustainable progress requires community-level norm change alongside legal reform.

Returnees vs. Incumbents: New Tensions

The return of Afghans from neighboring countries has introduced new dimensions to the land conflict in Afghanistan. Many returnees discover strangers residing on their properties, creating tensions between original owners and current occupants. Incomplete formal records and document forgery complicate legal verification, while returnees often lack familiarity with government procedures.
Powerbrokers frequently serve as critical intermediaries, leveraging their long-standing community knowledge to verify ownership claims. One Wakil recounted expelling a tenant who falsely claimed ownership, with police enforcement following the community leader's determination.
However, this dynamic reinforces powerbrokers' authority and may disadvantage returnees lacking local networks. The Occupancy Certificate framework could further complicate matters if adverse possessors gain formal rights after 15 years of occupation, potentially extinguishing returnees' claims.

Policy Recommendations: From Research to Actionable Change

The study proposes five targeted strategies to address structural inequalities underlying Land Conflict in Afghanistan:
  1. Tackling Government Corruption: Strengthening judicial independence and anti-corruption mechanisms is prerequisite for residents to trust formal dispute resolution channels.
  2. Community-Led Educational Trainings: Locally designed programs on land rights, titling processes, and women's inheritance rights can gradually shift community norms.
  3. Association of Powerbrokers: Creating networks among Imams, Maliks, and Wakil Guzars across communities could enhance collective capacity to hold powerful actors accountable.
  4. Increasing Community-Government Cooperation: Formal consultation mechanisms would ensure policies like the Occupancy Certificate reflect on-the-ground realities and community priorities.
  5. Strength in Informality: Rather than dismissing informal processes, policymakers should recognize their flexibility and explore hybrid approaches that integrate community wisdom with formal legal frameworks.
The research also emphasizes knowledge dissemination through "training of trainers" models and designating local "resource persons" to sustain engagement with power hierarchy concepts over time.

Conclusion: The Ongoing Value of Understanding Land Conflict in Afghanistan

This study makes a vital contribution by demonstrating that Land Conflict in Afghanistan cannot be resolved through formal titling initiatives alone. Power hierarchies—spanning land grabbers, corrupt officials, community powerbrokers, family structures, and returnee-incumbent dynamics—systematically shape who can access rights and resources.
Interventions that ignore these underlying inequalities risk perpetuating exclusion or creating new forms of informality atop formal systems.
For researchers, the paper offers a methodological template for investigating the intersection of power and property in fragile contexts. For housing professionals and policymakers, it underscores the necessity of coupling technical land administration reforms with targeted efforts to strengthen accountability, promote gender equity, and foster community-state collaboration.
As Kabul's peri-urban areas continue to expand under pressures of urbanization, displacement, and return migration, the insights from this research remain urgently relevant.
Addressing Land Conflict in Afghanistan demands not only better documentation but also a sustained commitment to transforming the power structures that determine whose claims are recognized, respected, and realized.